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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - UTAH FARM PRODUCTION
CREDIT ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 7588

COX, JEFFREY J. and ELLIOTT J.
a co-partnership, ELLIOTT J.
COX, JEFFREY J. COX, YVONNE
COX, BLANCHE COX, UNITED STATES
OF AMERICAN, TRACY-COLLINS BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, BANK OF
EPHRAIM

Defendant-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
UTAH FARM PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is a dispute over whether the appellant made
and breached a loan commitment to the repsondents and, if so, the
damages to the respondents from the breach.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court found that the appellant breached a
loan commitment to the respondents and that the respondents were
damaged in the sum of approximately

$44,ooo.oo,

which amount was

offset against the judgment entered in favor of the appellant
(not appealed) and that because of the offset the appellant was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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not entitled to any attorney 's fees in connection with its
judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON

APPEAL

Appellant requests the Court to reverse that portion
of the judgment that gave respondents an offset and that denied
appellant 1 s claim for attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

That the respondents are indebted to the appellant

in the sum of $167,995.29, plus eight percent (8%) per annum
from December 18, 1978, in connection with a promissory note.
(Findings of Fact 1-2)
2.

That said note was secured by real and personal

property and respondents agreed to pay a reasonable
fee if suit was brought to foreclose.

3.

(Findings of Fact 14)

That suit to foreclose was brought and a

reasonable attorney

4.

attorne~~

~

fee is $15,000.00. (Transcript 82)

That the appellant, through one of its loan

officers, entered into negotiations to loan money to the respondents fo~ 1977, for the respondents turkey growing business,
in addition to the amount previously loaned as reflected above.
(Transcript 235, 239)

5.

That the negotiations concerned two loans, one of

which was to be a seven year loan payable annually and the
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-3second of which was to be payable February 6, 1978, more than
one year after it would have been made. (Transcript 128-130,
270-271A; Defendants 'Exb. 30, Pg. 12, attached to Steve
Adamson

~

deposition)

6.

That the loan officer did not have authority to

authorize the loan the respondents were requesting because of
the amount. (Transcript 268)
7.

That the loan committee had to authorize the loan

and no such authorization was ever made. (Transcript 252, 313)
8.

That nothing was done by the appellant to justify

the respondents in concluding that the loan officer or anyone
else had apparent authority to authorize the loan.

(Transcript

118, 120)
9.
1977.

That no loan was ever made to the respondents for

(Findings of Fact 21)
10.

That the respondents did not seek any alternate

source of financing even though they could have received
financing from the Moroni Feed Company for 1977. (Transcript
106, 121, 136-138)
11.

That the respondents elected not to attempt to

remain in the turkey business for 1977 and elected to pursue
other business ventures.

In particular, Jeffrey Cox went to

work with Moroni Coal Company in April 1977, and received a
salary that he would not have otherwise received if he had
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remained in the turkey business.

There was a substantial

increase in profits in the Moroni Coal Company for 1977 and they
were reinvested in the company. Jeffrey Cox was a 46-47%
shareholder in Moroni Coal Company when the profits were made
and his return may have been the reason for the increase in
profits.

In determining respondents' damages, the trial court

only credited appellant with the salary and not the benefit to
Mr. Cox's stock and the benefit to the respondents' business.
(Transcript 139-142; 328-335)
12.

That the respondents' turkey growing operation had

suffered losses for the four years previous to 1977.

(Plain-

tiff's Exh. 31-34 )
13. That in negotiating with the respondents for a loan
for 1977, the appellant projected 900,200 pounds of turkey would
be processed.

No profit was projected for 1977 by either party.

(Transcript 227, 273-274)
14.

That prior to the time that the respondents

discontinued their turkey growing operation they took delivery
of 20,000 poults which were subsequently sold by them to a
grower who processed 312, 560 pounds from them. (Transcript 106107)
15. That whether the respondents would have actually
been able to get delivery of the other 40,000 poults would have

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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depended on whether the Board of Directors of the selling
company decided to accept the purchase order.

(Transcript 177)

The offset was based on the assumption that the respondents
would have had 60,000 turkeys.

(Transcript 328-335)

16. That the buyer of the 20,000 turkeys from the
respondents reimbursed the respondents for the turkeys. The
respondents presented no evidence as to the amount and said
amount was not deducted from their claimed profits. (Transcript

107' 328-335)
17.

That some expenses such as gas and fuel (other

than for brooding), rent and taxes were not deducted from the
claimed profit. (Defendants '··Exh. 30, page 12; Transcript 328-

335)

18. That for those growers that sold through the
Moroni Feed Company the average profit per pound of turkey
processed was four cents (4¢) and the average dividend was six
cents (6r/:.) per pound.

(Transcript 200, 207)

19. That the dividend would not be paid until 1982 and
would depend on the availability of money in Moroni Feed Company
at that time. (Transcript 210)

20. That the abilities of growers differ and no
evidence was introduced to show that the respondents were
average. (Transcript 209)
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
LOST PROFITS ARE NOT RECOVERABLE FOR BREACH OF A LOAN
AGREEMENT WHERE THE BORROWER FAIL·s TO MITIGATE DAMAGES
The measure of damages f-or breach of a contract to
lend money is the difference between the contract interest rate
and the increased interest rate the borrower is obligated to pay
in procuring a new loano

Restatement, Contracts §343 (1932); 5

A. Corbin, Contracts §1078, at 446 (1964); 36 A.L.R. 1409 at
1410-1411; 22 Am Jur 2d §608, Damages.

Ordinarily damages for

breach of a contract to loan money cannot be more than nominal
because the money may usually
rate.

be procured elsewhere at the same

36 A.L.R. 1409; 22 Am Jur 2d §69, Damages; Bank of New

Mexico v. Rice, 429 P.2d 368 (N.M. 1967); Investment Service
Company v. Smither, 556 P.2d 955 (Ore. 1976); Consolidated
American Life Ins. Co. v. Covington, 297 So. 2d 894 (Miss.
1974).
Like all other jurisdictions, the measure of damages
in Utah for breach of an agreement to loan money is the
difference, if any, between the contract interest rate and the
increased interest rate the borrower is obligated to pay in
procuring a new loan.
1978).

Cox Corp. v. Dugger, 583 P.2d 96 (Utah

The measure of damages is set forth in the dissenting

opinion which, as far as the measure of damages is concerned, 1~
in no way inconsistent with the majority opinion.
follows:

It say as
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"The normal measure of damages for breach of a
contract to loan money is the difference, if any,
between the interest rate contemplated in the
contract, between the parties, and the rate the
borrower obtained in the alternate loan; plus the
expense of obtaining the second loan. But where the
borrower is unable to obtain money elsewhere, and the
defendant knew of the particular purpose for which
the money was needed, special damages may be recovered, provided they are not speculative or
remote." (Emphasis added)
Under the law of this state, special damages are only
recoverable "where the borrower is unable to obtain money elsewhere." This is because general damages (increase in interest
rate in second loan) are generally the only damages where
another loan is obtained.
In the case at bar the respondents seek only special
damages which would not have arisen if they had obtained an
alternate loan.

As a matter of law, special damages are not

recoverable because the respondents made absolutely no effort to
obtain another loan even though they could have received
financing from the Moroni Feed Company for 1977. (Transcript
106, 121, 136-138)
It is the duty of the borrower to mitigate damages by
attempting to secure the money from other sources.

36 A.L.R.

1416; 22 Am Jur 2d §69, Damages; Restatement, Contracts §343
(1932); 5 A. Corbin, Contracts §1078, at 446 (1964); Davis v.
Small Business Inv. Co. of Houston.

535 SW2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App.
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1976).

No substantial damages may be recovered where it does

not appear that the money was unavailable elsewhere upon the
same terms.

36 A.L.R. 1416-1417.

Where there is no proof of an

attempt to get a loan from another source or no reason why such
an attempt was not made, no cause of action has been proven.
Davis v. Small Business Inv. Co. of Houston, supra; AMR'
Enterprises, Inc. v. United Postal Sav. Ass

~'

567 F2d 1277 (5th

Cir. 1978); Gooden v. Moses Broso, 13 So. 765 (Ala. 1893). It is
inequitable to require a lender to pay damages that the borrower
could have avoided.
Rather than get another loan, Jeffrey Cox went to work
with the Moroni Coal Company. That resulted in profits to that
Company and he was a 46-47% shareholder.

The profits were

reinvested in the Company. The appellant was not credited with
that benefit to the respondents, but only with Cox's salary.
Even if the appellant was given credit for the profit and even
if it was not enough to cover all the respondents alleged
damages, respondents would still not get the difference in
damages because the mitigation must, as a matter of law, be in
the form of an attempt to get another loan before special
damages are recoverable.

Furthermore, for all we know, the

profit to Moroni Coal Company was more than the damages claimed
by the respondents for the alleged breach of loan agreement.
(Transcript 139-142)

Respondents want the profits from two

businesses for the same year when they could not have been two
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places at once, at least not effectively.
Even the limited credit that the appellant was given
was incorrectly calculated.

Respondent, Jeff Cox, testified

that he went to work for the Moroni Coal Company in the
beginning of April, 1977, for the sum of $200.00 per week.
(Transcript 139, 141)

Accordingly, the trial court gave the

appellant a credit for $7,200.00 representing 36 weeks at
$200.00 per week.

Since Cox worked all but January - March, he

worked 39 weeks and the amount should have been $8000.00.

POINT TWO
THE LOAN OFFICER WHO ALLEGEDLY AUTHORIZED THE LOAN
HAD NO AUTHORITY
The appellant's loan officer did not have authority to
authorize the loan because of the amount. (Transcript 268) The
loan committee had to authorize the loan and no such
authorization was ever made.

(Transcript 252, 313)

Nothing was

done by the appellant to justify the respondents in concluding
that the loan officer or anyone else had apparent authority to
authorize the loan. (Transcript 118-120)

An agent has apparent

authority when the principal has made it appear that the agent
has authority and not when the agent has made it appear that
way. Malia v. Giles 114 P.2d 208; (Utah 1941); Bank of Salt Lake
v. Corporation of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter

Day Saints, 534 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975).

In the case at bar, the
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respondents' testimony was that their conclusion that the loan
officer had authority was based solely on his acts and not on
anything that the appellant did. (Transcript 118-120)

One

dealing with a supposed agent is bound to ascertain his
capacity.

Dohrmann Hotel Supply Company v. Beau Brummel, Inc.,

103 P.2d 650 (Utah 1940).
In this case the undisputed evidence was that the
agent had no express or implied authority.

It is also

undisputed that he had no apparent authority because the
respondents testified that the only conduct that may have given
the appearance of authority was that of the agent and not of the
principal.

Therefore, even if there was an agreement by the

loan officer to make a loan, such is invalid and not binding on
the appellant.

There is no evidence to support the trial

court's finding regarding authority.
POINT THREE
THE DAMAGE FOUND IN THIS CASE WAS NOT CONTEMPLATED
BY THE PARTIES AND IS NOT RECOVERABLE
Damages recoverable for breach of contract are limited
to those that are reasonably supposed to have been in the
contemplation of the parties as the probable result of its
breach at the time of the contract.

Cox Corp. v. Dugger 583

P.2d 96 (Utah 1978); Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford
Acc. & Ind. Co., 325 P.2d 906 (Utah 1958). In the case at bar,
the respondents had suffered losses in the four preceding years.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(Transcript 154, 158, 166)

At the time that the appellant

negotiated with the respondents regarding the 1977 loan, neither
party projected any profit to be made by the respondents for
that year.

(Transcript 273-274)

Apparently the parties

expected the respondents to break even after four years of
losses, in a step towards profitable years in the future.
Therefore, as a matter of law, the appellant is not liable to
the respondents, even if there would have been profits, because
such were not in the contemplation of the parties at the time of
the contract as required by law.

Even if there was evidence to

support Finding of Fact No. 21, that appellant decided to suffer
a loss rather than make the loan, the contemplated loss was
nominal.
POINT FOUR
THE "AGREEMENT" IS VOID UNDER THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
In this state, certain agreements are void unless in
writing.

The Statute of Frauds in this regard is set forth in

§25-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as follows:
"In the following cases every agreement shall be
void unless such agreement, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by
the party to be charged therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to
be performed within one year from the making
thereof." (Emphasis added)
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In the case at bar the court has determined that the
appellant breached an oral agreement to loan money to the
respondents. If there was an agreement, the undisputed terms of
that agreement would have to be that there were to be two loans
in January 1977 and that one of the loans was to be payable
February 1978, and the other loan was to be payable in seven
yearse

(Transcript 127-130, 270-271A)

Therefore, by the very

terms of the agreement that the court has found the appellant
made, performance was not to be within one year from making
thereof. Consequently, the agreement is void and unenforceable
under the Statute of Frauds.
Alternatively, if there was no agreement as to the
dates of repayment, the agreement would still be void. This is
because where no time for repayment of a loan is stipulated, the
law implies that it is to be repaid immediately or at the time
selected by the lender.

17 Am Jur 2d §338, Contracts.

In that

event the respondents could not claim any damages for breach of
a loan agreement because the the responents would not have had
the right to use the money for the year that it would take to
make the profit. 36 A.L.R. 1412; Restatement, Contracts §343
(1932), Comment a.
POINT FIVE
LOST PROFITS ARE NOT RECOVERABLE
The Supreme Court of Utah, citing Jenkins v. Morgan,
260 P.2d 532 (Utah, 1953), has previously said that "··· damages
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for anticipated profits are contingent upon so many
uncertainties that they are speculative and therefore not
recoverable, ••• "

Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 393 P.2d 468 (Utah

1964).

POINT SIX
DAMAGES ARE NOT RECOVERABLE BECAUSE THE RESPONDENTS
FAILED TO PROVE THEM WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY
In another opinion concerning the recoverability of
lost profits and concerning the need for damages to be established with reasonable certainty, the Supreme Court of Utah
said:
"The basic and general rule is that loss of
anticipated profits of a business venture involves so many factors of uncertainty that
ordinarily profits to be realized in the future
are too speculative to base an award of damages
thereon. The other side of the coin is that
damages to a business or enterprise need only
be proved with sufficient certainty that reasonable minds might believe from a preponderance
of the evidence that the damages were actually
suffered." Howarth v. Ostergard, 515 P.2d 442
(Utah 1973).
There are several reasons why the respondents failed
to prove damages with reasonable certainty as required by law.
These reasons are: (1) the evidence was that it was not
reasonably certain whether the respondents could have acquired
the last 40,000 poults, (2) the uncontroverted evidence was that
whether the respondents would have recovered a dividend
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from the Moroni Feed Company would have depended on the
availability of money in the Moroni Feed Company in 1982 from
which to pay dividends and no evidence was introduced to show
that such was reasonably certain and (3) there was no evidence
to show that the respondents were average turkey growers.
Therefore, the proof of the respondents has failed because, even
if the average grower earned a certain amount of profit, the
evidence is not reasonably certain that these respondents would
have also earned such a profit.

In fact it is totally

uncertain.
It is Not Reasonably
Certain That the Respondents Could Have Acquired
the Last 40,000 Poults
It is essential in every claim for lost profits to
prove that there was an opportunity to realize the profits.
Dunn, Recovery of Damages for Lost Profits, 146, §1.2 (1978).
8

The respondents first failure of proof in this regard was in not
proving with reasonable certainty that they could have acquired
the last 40,000 poults.

Whether the order for 40,000 poults

would have been accepted would have been at the option of the
Board of Directors of the selling company.

(Transcript 177)

This means that the damage award is speculative as to 2/3 of the
amount since it is only reasonably certain that respondents
would have had 1/3 of the turkeys to grow and sell.
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Whether the Respondents Would Have Recovered a Dividend from
the Moroni Feed Company is Speculative
The damage award for lost profits was from two
sources.

The first was -the average profit per pound for turkeys

sold to the Moroni Feed Company and the second was based on the
dividend that Moroni Feed Company paid to members like the
respondents. The dividend is speculative and unrecoverable as a
matter of law because of the fact that it would not be paid
until 1982 and would be dependent upon money being available in
the Moroni Feed Company in 1982 from which to pay the dividend.
(Transcript 210)

No evidence was introduced to show that it is

reasonably certain that the Moroni Feed Company will have the
money available in 1982.
Another error the trial court made was in reducing the
dividend 10% per year to reach a present value amount. That was
apparently the custom in the community.
by

Appellant is not bound

custom but only by what the present value of the dividend

would actually be.

An allowance for future damages must be

reduced to its present worth.

St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.

Co. v. Fox, 359 P.2d 710 (Okl. 1961)

Since it was not in this

case, the damage award is erroneously calculated as well as
unjustified for the other reasons stated herein.
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There Was No Evidence to Show That the Respondents
Were Average Turkey Growers and Would
Have Earned Such a Profit
The award to the respondent was made on the assumption
that since the average member of the Moroni Feed Company made
certain profits, that the respondents would have realized the
same profits5

There is nothing in the record to indicate that

the respondents were average.
profit.

Not all

growers made the same

The abilities of growers differs.

(Transcript 209)

To introduce evidence of another's experience requires
proof of the additional fact in the chain of inference that the
other operator ran its business in a comparable way.

Dunn,

Recovery of Damages For Lost Profits, 146, §5.8 (1978).

In the

case at bar, the respondents rely totally upon evidence of the
profits of others.

There is nothing in the record to prove that

the respondents business was in any way comparable. On the other
hand, the only evidence in the record is evidence that the
respondents lost money in the preceding four years and there is
nothing in the record to indicate that the other growers also
lost a similar amount of money in those years. Therefore, the
only inference that can be drawn from the evidence is that the
respondents were not comparable.
In the' case of Mullen v. Brantley, 195 S.E.2d 700
(Va. 1973), there was a claim for lost profits by the owner of a
Shakeys Pizza Parlor and he introduced evidence of profits
.derived at other Shakeys Pizza Parlors and the national average
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of all such restaurants.

The Court said that such evidence did

not present a reasonable basis upon which to judge with any
degree of reasonable certainty what the profits would have been
at the location in question.
case at bar.

The same is even more true in the

The average of the other growers is, by itself, no

basis for an award to these respondents.

There was absolutely no

evidence to even show that the respondents' facility was comparable or that they ran their business in a comparable way.
Lost profits were awarded in the case of ArcherDaniels-Midland Co. v. Paull, 188 F.Supp. (W.D. Ark. 1960),
because the plaintiff proved that other businesses in the area
that were used in comparison had substantially similar facilities
and were conducting there business in a similar manner.

In the

case of Butler v. Westgate State Bank, 602 P.2d 1276 (Kan. 1979),
it was held that the operators capability in running his business
was a factor to be considered in determing whether an award for
lost profits should be made.

In the case at bar the respondents

have failed to prove comparability in any way and their proof
therefore fails.
POINT SEVEN
TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS REQUIRES
A HISTORY OF PRIOR BUSINESS SUCCESS
In this state, as well as other jurisdictions, the
law is that damages for lost profits are speculative unless
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there is a successful business history.

In the case of Jenkins

v. Morgan, supra, the Supreme Court of Utah, citing other
authorities, said:
"·· • before special damages for loss of profits to
a general business occasioned by the wrongful acts of
another may be recovered, it must be made to appear
that the business had been in successful operation
for such a period of time as to give it permanency
and recognition, and that such business was earning
profit which could be reasonable ascertained and
approximated."
In the case at bar, the respondents business had lost
money for the four previous years.

(Plaintiff's Exhibits 31-34)

Since the respondents did not have a business that had been in
successful operation, the damages claimed are unrecoverable as a
matter of law.

The past history makes the damages too uncertain.
POINT EIGHT

THE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE NET PROFITS
Even in a case where the plaintiff is entitled to an
award for lost profits, the award is limited to net profits and
not gross profits.

22 Am Jur 2d §178, Damages.

The burden of

proof is on the plaintiff to show an amount that represents net
profits and it is his burden to recognize, prove, and deduct all
expenses so that the amount claimed represents net profits and
not gross profits.

Dunn, Recovery of Damages for Lost Profits,

14 6 § 6. 3 ( 19 7 8) •

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-19In the case at bar, the respondents failed to meet
their burden of proof.

Certain expenses were not deducted.

For

example, when the respondents discontinued their turkey growing
operation, they sold the 20,000 turkeys that they had taken
delivery of but they presented no evidence as to the amount they
received and it was not deducted from their claimed profit.
(Transcript_l07, 328-335)
Another example is in connection with fuel expenses.
When the parties were negotiating concerning the loan, a budget
of anticipated expenses was prepared.
Page 1)

(Defendants

1

Exb. 30,

Those expenses had to be deducted to arrive at net

profits. One of the expenses on the projected budget was for
"gas and fuel, including brooding." Only the brooding expense
was taken into account and not the gas and fuel for the trucks,
etc. (Transcript 108-111)

The appellant was not given credit for

that portion of that expense. Therefore, the respondents have
failed to meet their burden of proof because not all expenses
have been deducted.
Other expenses such as real estate taxes and real
estate payment for the property used in raising the turkeys,
were not deducted.

Admittedly, these are fixed expenses, that

the respondents would have had whether they remained in the
business or not.

Nevertheless, they are expenses that would

have reduced net profit.
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There was also a projected expense for $500.00 for
rent that was not deducted. (Transcript 111)
Interest expense is another expense that is incorrect.
The trial court gave the appellant credit for $9,000.00, which
the court said represents the amount of interest that the
respondents would have paid on the loan if they had received it.
When respondents filled out a "Request for Contract of Guarantee"
they projected interest in the amount of $25,000.00. (Defendants'
Exb. 30, Page 10)

That amount is more realistic. Respondents'

testimony was that the amount to be borrowed was $368,100.00.
(Transcript 124-125 ) No evidence was introduced to show the
interest rate but even if it had only been ten percent (10%) per
year, that would have been $36,810.00 in interest for the year
and yet the appellant was only credited with $9,000.00.

Even if

partial payments had been made during the year to reduce the
interest, no evidence was introduced to show the likelihood of
those payments or the amounts, therefore, the reduction is not
justified.
POINT NINE .
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED
After damages for lost profits in the amount of
$40,927.60 were awarded, an additional amount of $4,000.00, representing prejudgment interest, was added into the award.
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was improper because (1) prejudgment interest is not recoverable
on an unliquidated claim and (2) there was no evidence from
which the sum of $4,ooo.oo could have been calculated.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that prejudgment
interest is no allowable where damages are are unliquidated.
Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315 (Utah 1977).
The rationale behind this rule of law is very logical.
The party that is indebted in an unknown and unliquidated amount
cannot pay that amount until it is determined and, therefore,
should not be charged with prejudgment interest until
it is determined.

In the case at bar, this is even more true

because the respondents claimed the sum of $627,000.00 in their
counterclaim.

Perhaps it would have been different if

respondents had made demand for the amount the court found they
were entitled to.
There is further.error in the rate of interest awarded.
From the ruling it cannot be determined how the amount of

$4,ooo.oo was calculated but it would appear that the court took
the sum of $40,927.60, representing the offset, and added ten
percent (10%) for interest and rounded off to $4,000.00.
Apparently, this was on the theory that the appellant was
charging the respondent with interest at ten percent (10%) per
annum and if the respondents had an offset, then they would have
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saved interest if they had been credited with it at the time that
it was due.

(Transcript 332)

The fallacy in that thinking is

that it was never legally a credit during the time that it was
unliquidated. Furthermore, it is totally independent from the
indebtedness due from the respondents to the appellant on the
notes. The second fallacy is in the fact that the note from the
respondents to the appellant, under which the appellant was
awarded judgment, only called for interest at the rate of 8.01
percent per annum with an adjustment possibility.
Exb. 18)

(Plaintiff's

However, no evidence was introduced to show that the

amount was increased. Therefore, the prejudgment interest was not
only improper as a matter of law, because it was unliquidated,
but was erroneously calculated because ten percent (10%) per
annum was not within the evidence.

The trial court had no right

to estimate an amount.
POINT TEN
ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISALLOWED
The undisputed testimony at the trial was that a
reasonably attorney's fee for the appellant is the sum of
$15,000eOO.

Attorney's fees were denied because the respondents

succeeded on a portion of their counterclaim.

The decision and

the rationale behind the decision are illogical and against the
law.
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Where the holder of a note containing a provision for
the payment of attorney's fees brings an action on the note and
the plaintiff's recovery is lessened, but not completely
extinguished by the defendant's recovery on a counterclaim, the
allowance for attorney's fees should be proportionately reduced
based on the difference between the amount due on the note and
the defendants 'recovery on the counterclaim.

Morgan v.

Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 106 So 136 (Ala.

192~;

Pioneer

Constructors v. Symes, 267 P.2d 740 (Ariz 1954); Bon Giovanni v.
Fickett, 10 P.2d 539 (Cal. 1932); State Trust & Sav. Bank v.
Hermosa Land and Cattle Co., 240 P. 469 (N.M. 1925); Meadow
Valley Land & Invest Co. v. Manerud, 159 P. 559 (Ore. 1916);
Tompkins v. Galveston Street R. Co., 23

v. Boydston, 134

s.w.

s.w.

25 (Tex. 1892); Ward

786 (Tex. 1911); Ware v. Paxton, 266

s.w.

2d 218 (Tex. 1954).
The approach taken in those cases is reasonable and
logical.

If the rationale is followed that any counterclaim that

is successful to any degree precludes attorney's fees entirely,
then some absurd results would follow.

For example, suppose

defendant was liable on a note for $1,000,000.00 and said
defendant had a counterclaim for $100.00 or suppose defendant was
awarded $1.00 in nominal damages.

Certainly in that event the

counterclaimant 's recovery should not preclude attorney~ fees.
Logically, it should be reduced proportionately.

In this case,
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the counterclaim reduced the judgment by twenty-seven percent
(27%).

Reducing the attorney's fees proportionately would leave

an award for attorney's fees in the amount of $10,988.50.
Of course, appellant contends that the counterclaim
should be dismissed and that therefore, attorney's fees need not
be reduced ..
CONCLUSION
Because of the speculative nature of damage claims for
lost profits, this Court has been reluctant to make any award
except where it is proven with reasonable certainty.

In the case

at bar it cannot be said that the claim has been proven with
reasonable certainty.

In fact, there are many uncertainties.

There are at least five major independent reasons why
the counterclaim should be dismissed.

If the law is found to be

in favor of the appellant in connection with any one of these,
then the counterclaim must be dismissed as a matter of law.

They

are as follows:
1.

The respondents failed to mitigate damages by

failing to make _any attempt to get an alternate source of
financing.

Under the case of Cox Corp. v. Dugger, supra, the

special damages claimed by the respondents must be denied for
failure to attempt to mitigate.

The respondents discontinued

their turkey operation and had a very successful year in the
Moroni Coal Company and they want the profit from both ventures
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even though they could not have been in both places at the same
time.
2.

The loan officer had no express, implied or

apparent authority to make any loan.

3.

The evidence is undisputed.

Damages for lost profits must have been within the

contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract.

Since

they were not contemplated by either party the counterclaim must
be dismissed.

4.

Any agreement that by its terms is not to be per-

formed within one year is void unless in writing under the
Statute of Frauds.

The agreement that the trial court found that

the appellant made was an agreement to make a loan that by its
terms would not have been payable within a year.

Therefore,

since it was not in writing, it is void and unenforceable.

5.

The respondents failed to prove that they were

average turkey growers or that_ they ran their business in a way
that was comparable to the other growers or that their facility
was in any way comparable.

Therefore, there is a crucial missing

link in the chain of evidence.

In other words, there is no

connection between the fact that other growers earned a certain
profit and that therefore the respondents would have earned such
a profit.

6.

There was no prior history of successful operation.

Again, as a matter of law, this makes the damage award too
speculative.
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There were several other errors in the trial.

Although

these only reduce the counterclaim, the counterclaim would still
be entirely dismissed if any of the errors stated above are found
in favor of the appeilant.
1.

These additional errors are:

An $800.00 error in calculating the salary to Jeff

Cox for the time that he went to work for Moroni Coal Company.
This additional amount should have been credited to the appellant.
2.

Since it is not reasonably certain that the

respondents could have taken delivery of the last 40,000 poults,
two-thirds (2/3) of the counterclaim award is speculative.

3.

Since it is speculative as to whether the dividend

will be available in 1982, the sum of $28,940.40, representing
the dividend portion of the counterclaim award, is speculative.

4.

Since not all of the expenses were deducted from

the claimed profits, the amount of the counterclaim is incorrect
and this would require its dismissal entirely because the
respondents have failed to meet their burden of proof.

5.

The award must be reduced $4,000.00 because

prejudgment interest is improper because prejudgment interest
cannot be awarded on an unliquidated amount and because there was
no evidence to support the amount calculated by the trial court.
As a matter of law the counterclaim should be dismissed
and appellant should be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee.
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Even if the counterclaim were allowed, at best for the
respondents, the attorney's fee would only be proportionately
reduced under the law.
In summary there are too many reasons against allowing
the counterclaim and offset to remain.

There would be nothing

inequitable about denying the counterclaim and precluding the
respondents from obtaining money that they never had and money
that it is not reasonably certain that they could have had.

In

fact, it appears most uncertain.
z~
Dated this __
.__,_._day of May, 1980.

Respectfully submitted,
\

L)'-L.; ~'--l c .

David B. Boyce
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